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SUMMARY
Over the past decade, rapid and profound change in the Arctic has been accompanied by a sense of global 
unease about the future of the region. This paper provides a short overview of the role the United Kingdom 
(UK), as the Arctic’s ‘closest neighbour’ – and increasingly close partner of Norway – might be expected to 
play in the security architecture of the Arctic. Specifically, the focus is on challenges relating to the changing 
environment, emerging economic opportunities and geopolitical shifts among Arctic stakeholders. The paper 
argues that the UK could address two factors in particular, those of credibility and presence, in order to par-
ticipate effectively in the emerging Arctic security architecture.
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ARCTIC SECURITY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
While the UK has no sovereign territory to defend 
in the Arctic, it sees itself as the Arctic’s “closest 
neighbour”, a proximity which creates both chal-
lenges and opportunities, especially given the po-
tential for the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap (GIUK) 
to become a gateway for traffic traversing newly 
accessible Arctic sea routes. At the same time, the 
UK is also a permanent member of the UN Secu-
rity Council, a leading member of NATO, and the 
country with the fourth highest spending on defence 
in the world (SIPRI 2012). The UK has tended to 
adopt a global perspective when it comes to national 
and international security; a perspective which the 
Arctic is undoubtedly increasingly part of. This arti-
cle provides an overview of some of the UK’s more 
recent defence and security interests in the Arctic, 
and considers how the UK might contribute to the 
future security of the region as a whole. 
REVITALISED INTEREST
Since at least 2008, the UK Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) has been increasingly attentive to the envi-
ronmental, economic and geopolitical changes tak-
ing place in the Arctic. Although the Arctic was not 
mentioned in either the Strategic Defence and Secu-
rity Review (SDSR) or the National Security Strategy 
(both of which were published in 2010), the MOD 
has been actively scoping out the kinds of oppor-
tunities, risks and capability challenges that could 
emerge in the Arctic in the future. At the same time, 
through continuing participation in multinational 
military exercises and (albeit reduced) ‘Cold Weather 
Training’ for Royal Marine Commandos, the MOD 
has been testing its capacity to perform military tasks 
in and around the waters of Norway’s ‘High North’ 
(Depledge and Dodds 2012).
The UK government has declared a range of inter-
ests in the Arctic:
•	 The protection of the Arctic environment and 
ecosystem.
•	 Supporting and encouraging continued co- 
operation among the Arctic states. 
•	 The effects of climate change on the Arctic and 
the Arctic as a barometer of climate change.
•	 The potential of the Arctic to strengthen energy 
security and the sustainable use and safe ex-
traction of resources. 
•	 The opening up of the Arctic to increased ship-
ping and related issues, including the new Polar 
Shipping Code.
•	 The sustainable management of any new fishing 
grounds in the Arctic.
•	 The study of the region by UK scientists. 
Alongside these specific interests, the UK also has 
a number of more general concerns which are likely 
to become more relevant in the Arctic, most notably 
the maintenance of global norms such as the Free-
dom of Navigation and the application of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
Clearly, not all of these interests are directly relevant 
to defence and security. From an MOD perspective, 
the principal challenges are:
Environmental: relating to the natural challenges spe-
cific to operating in the Arctic including the extreme 
cold, extended days and nights and magnetic inter-
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ference, as well as to the environmental standards 
that MOD equipment must adhere to;
Economic: relating to emerging economic opportuni-
ties in the Arctic (resource development, shipping, 
tourism) which could increase the need for a military 
presence in the region to provide security and assis-
tance to assets, infrastructure and citizens;
Geopolitical: relating to shifts in the strategic pos-
tures of, and relations between, Arctic and other in-
terested states which may (re)mobilise antagonisms 
and alliances. 
The drive towards developing a greater understand-
ing of these challenges has coincided with a broader 
resurgence of MOD interest in the UK’s potential 
role in what one commentator has referred to as the 
‘Wider North’ (Rogers 2012). In 2010, the then-
UK Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, took the initiative 
to establish a Northern Group of Defence Minis-
ters which continues to meet on an annual basis 
to discuss the shared security concerns of northern 
European nations including the Nordic and Baltic 
countries. The UK has also sought specifically to 
strengthen its relationship with Norway, a key sup-
plier of UK energy, through a range of high-level 
agreements on defence, oil and gas exploration, re-
newable energy, biotechnology and cooperation in 
both the Arctic and Antarctica (Depledge 2012). 
The impetus for these activities is not tied to any 
sense of an ‘imminent’ threat to the security of the 
UK or its allies (NATO’s collective defence agree-
ment covers the Atlantic side of the Arctic all the 
way to the North Pole). Instead, the MOD’s priority 
has been to attempt to anticipate the types of threat 
(if any) that could emerge in the future, and estab-
lish what kinds of capabilities are needed to mini-
mise the risks to UK interests should any of these 
threats be realised. The imperative for doing so is 
tied to the uncertainty which characterises ongoing 
environmental, economic and geopolitical change in 
the Arctic. The kinds of security concerns that have 
been postulated are generally associated with the 
disruption of energy supplies or shipping activities. 
Paul Beaver, for example, has sketched out a series 
of security challenges for the UK, principally linked 
to a lack of capabilities to monitor and intervene in 
the newly emerging Arctic maritime domain, and 
(linked to this) a lack of military presence to offer 
assurances to the UK’s Nordic allies that the UK 
can still make a credible contribution to the defence 
of the ‘High North’ (Beaver 2011). However, while 
it seems certain that hydrocarbon and maritime- 
related activities will increase in the Arctic, the scale 
and extent of potential developments, as well as the 
key stakeholders, remains uncertain, and, therefore, 
so does their strategic importance. 
CONTRIBUTING TO ARCTIC SECURITY
A number of the UK’s concerns about the present 
and future security of the Arctic are shared by Arc-
tic states, especially the UK’s NATO allies (the US, 
Canada, Norway and Denmark). These include is-
sues surrounding search and rescue, environmental 
remediation, piracy, terrorism, natural and man-
made disaster response and border protection out-
lined by the Center of Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) in 2012 (Conley et al. 2012). In 
2009, the UK’s then-Minister for International 
Defence and Security, Baroness Ann Taylor, spoke 
about Arctic security at a joint NATO–Iceland con-
ference on ‘Security Prospects in the High North’. 
In particular, she emphasised a need for consensus 
between interested parties on territorial rights, re-
source rights, access to shipping straits, scientific 
exploration, environmental protection and coopera-
tion on security and military activity in the region.2 
None of these things contradict the various strate-
gies outlined by the Arctic states, or the agendas of 
existing institutional structures for international and 
regional cooperation. 
What is questionable is the extent to which the Arc-
tic states are interested in involving the UK in Arc-
tic security affairs. Canada has declared that it sees 
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no role for NATO in the Canadian Arctic, and given 
Canada’s security relationship with the US, there is 
little need to further involve the UK at a bilateral lev-
el.3 Russia is also firmly against a NATO presence in 
the Arctic. The Nordic countries on the other hand, 
especially Norway, do see a role for NATO, largely to 
provide reassurance that the alliance’s security com-
mitments to Northern Europe are not forgotten. The 
UK, as a key member of NATO and as a geographi-
cally proximate state, is therefore still regarded as an 
important ally of the Nordics when it comes to the 
security of the north. However, as the Arctic states 
continue to develop and upgrade their own military 
capabilities, while at the same time bolstering their 
collective claim of responsibility for the Arctic, the 
support of countries such as the UK could dimin-
ish. While the UK attends the Arctic Security Forces 
Roundtable, greater security cooperation between 
the Arctic states could mean there will be less inter-
est in involving non-Arctic states as anything more 
than observers to the process. One might look to 
the recent example of how negotiations of the Arctic 
Search and Rescue Treaty and the Oil Spill Prepar-
edness Response Treaty were conducted among the 
Arctic states – the UK’s offer to provide input into 
these negotiations was rejected. 
However, another dynamic that should be taken into 
account concerns the expectations of the British 
public. At present, it is probably fair to suggest that 
the broader public is largely unaware about poten-
tial security challenges in the Arctic. This is likely 
to change quickly if there is an incident, even if we 
consider ‘softer’ security issues such as a cruise ship 
accident involving British citizens, a major oil spill 
involving a UK-based company (consider the fallout 
from the Macondo catastrophe which BP was im-
plicated in) or an attack on infrastructure owned by 
UK-based companies. In any of these situations, the 
public is likely to want to know both how such an 
incident was possible in the first place and what the 
UK government is doing to assist. Thus while inter-
national expectations of the UK might not be very 
high, domestic pressure for the UK to increase its 
engagement with Arctic security issues could grow 
rapidly. 
CREDIBILITY AND PRESENCE
With regard to both the level of international and 
domestic expectations about the UK’s role in any 
emerging security architecture for the Arctic, and 
given the uncertainty which characterises the chang-
es taking place in the Arctic, the biggest challenge 
for the UK will be to establish where the Arctic sits 
relative to the UK’s other strategic interests and 
how this is balanced with investment in the UK’s 
defence requirements elsewhere in the world. Arc-
tic operations “are likely to be a force driver, requir-
ing a dditional capabilities, suitably designed for the 
conditions, with appropriate support” (Murgatroyd 
2009, p. 85). However, in 2010, the Strategic De-
fence and Security Review (SDSR) and the National 
Security Strategy both focused attention on out-of-
area operations in the Middle East and East Africa 
rather than Northern Europe. North Africa has also 
been rising up the strategic agenda since 2011. To 
meet these challenges, the SDSR has prioritised ca-
pabilities that meet the requirements for an adaptable 
defence posture, as well as reducing overall defence 
costs which may soon dip below 2 per cent of GDP. 
This will make it challenging for the UK to justify in-
vestment for the kinds of Arctic-specific capabilities 
that are likely to be required, especially where they 
cannot easily be adapted or retrofitted to work with 
existing capabilities. The capability challenge may be 
further complicated by the development of interna-
tional environmental regulations regarding the kinds 
of technologies that can be deployed on vessels 
operating in Arctic waters (for example, the Polar 
Code which is still being negotiated by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organisation). The long lead-times 
involved in developing new capabilities means that 
these issues need to be resolved as soon as possible 
if the UK is to maintain a role for itself in the Arctic 
security architecture in the coming years. 
In the meantime, the UK’s naval capabilities are 
thinly stretched, and at least in the short term are 
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likely to struggle to respond to contingencies in the 
Arctic. As others have noted, the 2010 SDSR deci-
sion to cancel the Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
programme has for the time being deprived the 
UK of valuable surveillance capabilities for support 
anti-submarine warfare, maritime situation aware-
ness and search and rescue (Beaver 2011; Willett 
2011). The SDSR also reduced the size of the UK’s 
surface fleet from 23 to 19, meaning the UK also 
has very few vessels spare for contributing to any po-
tential operations in Arctic waters, whether for the 
purpose of military operations, policing (e.g. moni-
toring compliance with any international environ-
mental regulations which may emerge) or offering 
support for search and rescue or oil spill response. 
Until the UK economy is on a path of sustainable 
recovery, it is highly unlikely that these capabili-
ties will be expanded at least in the next five–ten 
years, especially since the UK is already struggling to 
fund key successor programmes (such as the Type 
26 frigates, Joint Strike Fighters and deterrence re-
placement). This lack of material military capacity is 
likely to generate further apprehension on behalf of 
the Arctic states about relying on the UK to provide 
support to any emerging Arctic security structure. 
One response from the UK Government could be to 
at least maintain and, where possible, increase its 
focus, on two factors in the Arctic: credibility and 
presence. This includes for example, increasing ef-
forts to map the changes underway in the Arctic, 
whether physical, political, social or economic. This 
knowledge will provide the basis for future-facing 
judgements about the scale of risks and opportuni-
ties in the Arctic, especially when it comes to de-
veloping capabilities (Depledge 2012). The UK can 
also continue participating in multilateral exercises 
involving Arctic partners to show Arctic states that 
it still has equipment for operating in the Arctic, 
as well as personnel who embody the knowledge, 
skills and experience necessary for acting in extreme 
cold weather environments (Depledge and Dodds, 
2012). Without maintaining these capabilities (even 
at the current minimal level), the UK will struggle 
to make itself relevant to the Arctic security com-
munity. However, a degree of expectation manage-
ment is also likely to be needed. While interest in 
the Arctic is high, activity is still relatively low (and 
starting from a very low base). As such, the Arctic 
remains a low priority concern for UK defence plan-
ners with a global perspective of national and inter-
national security, despite the increasing attention it 
is receiving. While the continuing stability of the re-
gion is vital, the UK might even be hopeful that the 
security architecture can be managed by the Arctic 
states themselves, particularly through the strength-
ening of new fora such as the Arctic Security Forces 
Roundtable with which all of the Arctic states are 
currently engaged. 
NOTES
1 For a review of UK Arctic interests see Depledge and Dodds, 2011.
2 For the full text of Baroness Ann Taylor’s speech visit http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.
mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/MinISD/20090129JointNatoicelandicGovernmentCo
nferencesecurityProspectsInHighNorthReykjavicIceland.htm. 
3 It is worth noting that the UK military already participates in numerous training programmes in Canada. http://
ukincanada.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-canada/defence/uk-military-training-in-canada.
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